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HEALING A FRACTURED PREEMPTION
DOCTRINE: THE IMPACT OF MERCK SHARP &
DOHME CORP. V. ALBRECHT ON IMPOSSIBILITY
PREEMPTION DEFENSES
Elizabeth Marley*
Patient safety depends on tort litigation to identify a brand-name drug’s
undisclosed risks, illuminate flaws in a drug’s design, and raise concerns
that a drug requires further study before it is safe for patient use. However,
since the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Wyeth v. Levine, which
permitted the plaintiff to move forward but recognized an in-principle
impossibility preemption defense, drug manufacturers have shielded
themselves from liability under a range of circumstances. Under this
defense, federal law preempts state law tort actions against brand-name drug
manufacturers in any court across the country. Yet, the scope of the
impossibility preemption defense remains unclear.
On May 20, 2019, the Supreme Court clarified its interpretation of
impossibility preemption in Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht. This
case involved state law claims regarding Merck’s alleged failure to
adequately warn patients and physicians of the risks of femoral fractures
associated with Fosamax, a drug used to treat osteoporosis in
postmenopausal women. In Albrecht, the Supreme Court decided that
impossibility preemption is a question of law for judges to decide, rather than
a question of fact for a jury. The Court also elaborated on Wyeth’s
requirements for a viable impossibility preemption defense. Ultimately,
rather than deciding whether or not the plaintiffs’ state law claim in Albrecht
was preempted, the Court remanded the case. For now, the future of
impossibility preemption defenses is left for lower courts to decide, but
Albrecht provides the framework within which they must decide it.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Albrecht marks a step forward in the
muddled path the Court has forged in this area. While the Court attempts to
provide a simple analytical framework for determining when impossibility
preemption defenses succeed, questions remain about the power and
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applicability of this defense for brand-name drug manufacturers. This Note
seeks to provide lower courts deciding impossibility preemption questions
with a functional understanding of where the doctrine stands after Albrecht.
Given the increasing pace of new brand-name drug approvals and the rise
of product liability litigation involving pharmaceuticals, it is crucial that
future litigants are aware of the status of the impossibility preemption
defense. If this defense still exists after Albrecht, it is also imperative that
courts know it when they see it.
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INTRODUCTION
[T]he question that we’re all kind of struggling with here seems to me to be
this, or something along these lines: Reading the statute your way, do we
create a moral hazard that encourages manufacturers to supply the FDA
with a lot of information, overwhelming with data, but maybe not the most
artfully drafted and maybe deliberately inartfully drafted warning that it
thinks is reasonably calculated to be refused, so that it can avoid having to
shoulder or . . . internalize its own costs of negligence?
—Justice Neil Gorsuch1

It is a settled expectation that if a prescription drug manufacturer fails to
provide adequate warnings about the risks of a medication and a patient
taking the medication as intended suffers an unexpected injury as a result of
the inadequate warning, the patient has a remedy at law. For decades,
however, pharmaceutical manufacturers have advocated an impossibility
preemption defense: that the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA)
approval of a drug label or rejection of a proposed label change prevents
patients from bringing state law tort actions alleging deficient labeling
because compliance with both state and federal law is impossible.
In Wyeth v. Levine,2 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether FDA
regulations preempt state law failure-to-warn claims against brand-name
drug manufacturers. In this landmark decision, the Court held that a state
law failure-to-warn claim could proceed even if the FDA had fully approved
a drug’s label.3 Defendant-manufacturers could only escape liability if they
could provide “clear evidence that the [FDA] would not have approved a
change to [the drug’s] label.”4 The Court noted that Wyeth, the drug
manufacturer, did not present such evidence,5 but the Court left the standard
otherwise undefined. On its face, Wyeth presented a major win for plaintiffs
and potentially signaled the death of impossibility preemption for
manufacturers who could not establish this “demanding defense.”6 However,
a more sophisticated interpretation of Wyeth permitted brand-name drug
manufacturers to pursue exactly the strategy Justice Gorsuch adverted to in

1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S.
Ct. 1668 (2019) (No. 17-290).
2. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
3. See id. at 581.
4. Id. at 571.
5. Id. at 572 (“Wyeth has offered no such evidence.”).
6. Id. at 573.
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the Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht7 oral arguments: overwhelming
the FDA with data in an effort to ensure a proposed label was rejected.8
Unfortunately, courts have reached opposite conclusions about the limits of
the impossibility preemption defense over the last decade, so it remains
unclear when state law failure-to-warn claims can proceed.9
For example, a district court judge in New Jersey recently threw out
hundreds of state law failure-to-warn claims that the Third Circuit later
vacated and remanded based on conflicting interpretations of Wyeth.10 This
litigation culminated in Albrecht, where, “[i]n light of differences and
uncertainties among the courts of appeals and state supreme courts in respect
to the application of Wyeth,” the Supreme Court further clarified the
procedure for deciding impossibility preemption defenses.11 The question
presented in Albrecht was simple: whether a judge or a jury should decide
impossibility preemption defenses.12 In an opinion by Justice Breyer, the
Court succinctly reasoned that judges are “better equipped” than juries “to
evaluate the nature and scope of an agency’s determination . . . and to
interpret agency decisions in light of the governing statutory and regulatory
context.”13 Therefore, the Court held preemption is a question of law for
judges to decide.14
The Court’s analysis did not stop there. As part of his opinion for the
Court, Justice Breyer elaborated on Wyeth’s impossibility preemption
requirements. The Court defined Wyeth’s “clear evidence” standard as
“evidence that shows the court that the drug manufacturer fully informed the
FDA of the justifications for the warning required by state law and that the
FDA, in turn, informed the drug manufacturer that the FDA would not
approve a change to the drug’s label to include that warning.”15 The Court
also held that “clear evidence” is not a heightened evidentiary standard but
rather a requirement that the court consider “whether the relevant federal and
state laws ‘irreconcilably conflict.’”16 Lastly, the Court noted that the only
agency actions that can determine the answer to preemption questions are
those “taken pursuant to the [FDA’s] congressionally delegated authority.”17
On its face, the 9-0 Albrecht decision resolved an easy case—the opinion
settles a narrow procedural question and appears to define Wyeth’s clear
7. 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019).
8. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 13.
9. See, e.g., Mason v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“The Supreme Court, however, did not clarify what constitutes ‘clear evidence.’”); Dobbs v.
Wyeth Pharm., 797 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1270 (W.D. Okla. 2011) (“[L]ower courts are left to
determine what satisfies this ‘clear evidence’ standard in each case.” (quoting Schilf v. Eli
Lilly & Co., No. CIV 07-4015, 2010 WL 3909909, at *4 (D.S.D. Sept. 30, 2010))).
10. See In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d 268, 302 (3d
Cir. 2017), vacated sub nom. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668.
11. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1676.
12. Id. at 1672.
13. Id. at 1680.
14. Id. at 1679.
15. Id. at 1672.
16. Id. at 1679 (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)).
17. Id.
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evidence requirement along the way. But the Court’s deeper analysis of
Wyeth raises complex questions about when state law failure-to-warn claims
involving brand-name prescription drugs can proceed. This Note elaborates
on the framework sketched by Justice Breyer in the majority opinion,
identifies the gaps that remain, and suggests how those gaps may be filled.
Manufacturers raising impossibility preemption defenses and courts deciding
preemption questions must both understand what “fully inform[s]” the FDA
under Justice Breyer’s framework.18 Future litigants and judges must also
understand when state and federal laws “irreconcilably conflict”19 and what
agency actions fall within the FDA’s “congressionally delegated
authority.”20 The concurring opinions in Albrecht and lower court decisions
after Wyeth offer important clues to inform this analysis. Without answers
to these lingering questions, impossibility preemption will remain an area
where “muddle . . . dominates over clarity.”21
This Note is organized into three parts. Part I examines the impossibility
preemption landscape leading up to Albrecht, including the landmark Wyeth
decision and its aftermath. Part II examines the Albrecht decision and
identifies three core interpretive issues that arise from the majority opinion,
which must be resolved before courts can uniformly address impossibility
preemption defenses. Part III explores how lower courts should approach the
interpretive issues identified in Part II and argues that while the Albrecht
decision is more complex than it appears, it is nonetheless illuminating for
courts deciding impossibility preemption defenses as a matter of law.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMPOSSIBILITY PREEMPTION IN BRAND-NAME
PRESCRIPTION DRUG CASES
Part I of this Note examines the evolution of federal preemption
jurisprudence. Part I.A provides an overview of federal preemption
principles in the context of brand-name prescription drugs and highlights the
confusion among courts deciding impossibility preemption defenses before
Wyeth. Part I.B examines the Supreme Court’s landmark Wyeth decision.
Part I.C assesses Wyeth’s impact on federal preemption jurisprudence over
the last decade, which culminated in the Albrecht case that is the focus of this
Note.
A. Preemption Principles
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that the
“Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme
18. Id. at 1672.
19. Id. at 1679.
20. Id.
21. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agency Preemption: More Muddle, or
Creeping to Clarity, 45 TULSA L. REV. 197, 229 (2009); see also Brief of Tort Law Professors
John C. P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at
*4, Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (No. 17-290) (“The application of implied preemption doctrine
untethered from any guiding text carries great risk of undermining federalism values.”).
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Law of the Land.”22 This language serves as the foundation for the federal
preemption doctrine, which mandates that when state and federal laws
conflict, the federal law takes precedence and the state law is preempted.23
“[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption
case,”24 and there is a “presumption against pre-emption.”25 While there is
serious debate among the Justices about the purpose of Congress regarding
preemption, as well as the scope of the presumption against preemption, these
principles remain cornerstones of modern preemption law.26
The Supreme Court has identified three types of preemption: “express
preemption,” in which a federal law expressly states that it preempts state
law; “field preemption,” in which federal law occupies the entire field of an
issue; and “conflict preemption,” in which either simultaneous compliance
with federal and state regulations is impossible (“impossibility preemption”)
or state law poses an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal goals
(“obstacle preemption”).27 This Note will focus on brand-name drug
manufacturers’ use of the impossibility preemption defense.
1. Federal Drug Labeling Regulations
Manufacturers of brand-name pharmaceutical products are subject to the
product approval and labeling standards articulated by the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act28 (FDCA). To distribute a drug, a manufacturer
must demonstrate to the FDA that the drug is “safe for use under the
conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed
labeling.”29 Before a drug is approved for distribution, the FDA must
approve the exact text of the label.30 Drug manufacturers are also required
to submit proposed label changes to the FDA as new information arises to
ensure that labels remain accurate while the drug is on the market.31
To propose labeling changes, manufacturers may submit a Prior Approval
Supplement (PAS) application, which the FDA then must approve before
changes can be implemented.32 Alternatively, under the FDA’s “Changes
Being Effected” (CBE) regulation, manufacturers may unilaterally add to or
strengthen a label “to reflect newly acquired information.”33 Manufacturers
who file a supplemental application under the CBE regulation can make these

22. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
23. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018).
24. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470, 485 (1996)).
25. Id. at 565 n.3.
26. See Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 213.
27. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000).
28. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399(h).
29. Id. § 355(d).
30. Id.
31. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)–(c) (2019).
32. See id. § 314.70(b).
33. See id. § 314.70(c).
33. See id.
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label changes immediately without FDA approval.34 However, the FDA will
reject CBE revisions if it determines there is insufficient evidence of a causal
link between use of the drug and the risk at issue.35 These types of label
rejections reflect the FDA’s concern that excessive or unnecessary warnings
may discourage appropriate use of a valuable drug.36
2. State Law Failure-to-Warn Claims
Although the FDA must approve a drug’s label before it reaches the
market, FDA approval does not automatically bar state law tort actions
alleging that a label is incomplete.37 Indeed, the Court’s decision in Wyeth
states that Congress declined to include a private right of action for damages
when it enacted the FDCA in 1938, specifically because damages claims
were widely available under state law.38 In the eighty-one years since the
FDCA’s enactment, no express preemption clause has been added.39 The
Supreme Court has also rejected field preemption in the pharmaceutical and
medical device areas.40
In the early 2000s, pharmaceutical defendants began to pursue the only
remaining avenue for preemption by raising conflict preemption defenses.41
Manufacturers argued that state tort law required them to act in ways that
federal regulations precluded.42 Specifically, manufacturers argued that
simultaneous compliance with both federal and state law was impossible
because the FDA either rejected or would have rejected a warning label
required under state law.43
34. See id.
35. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
36. See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs,
Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,605–06 (Aug. 22, 2008) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 601, and 814).
37. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567 (2009) (“The 1962 amendments added a
saving clause, indicating that a provision of state law would only be invalidated upon a ‘direct
and positive conflict’ with the FDCA.”(quoting Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87781, 76 Stat. 781, 793)).
38. See id. at 574 n.7 (citing the legislative history of the FDCA).
39. See id. at 567 (noting that Congress amended the FDCA to include an express
preemption clause for medical devices, but that “it declined to enact such a provision for
prescription drugs”).
40. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab’ys, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717 (1985)
(explaining that courts should not infer field preemption “whenever an agency deals with a
problem comprehensively,” because such an inference would be inconsistent with “the
federal-state balance embodied in [the Court’s] Supremacy Clause jurisprudence”).
41. See Mason v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 390–91 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“Interestingly enough, the idea of conflict preemption in prescription drug cases is relatively
new. Until the early 2000s, prescription drug companies infrequently invoked the preemption
defense, and when they did, it rarely succeeded.”(first citing Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods.,
Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 537 (6th Cir. 1993); and then citing Hill v. Searle Lab’ys, 884 F.2d 1064,
1068 (8th Cir. 1989))).
42. See Brief for Petitioner at 26–27, Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555 (No. 06-1249) (“Respondent’s
state-law tort claims conflict with the regime Congress established in the FDCA . . . .”).
43. Id. at 26 (noting that “it would have been impossible for Wyeth to comply with the
purported state-law duty to modify Phenergan’s labeling to contraindicate intravenous
administration of Phenergan without violating the FDCA”).
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Impossibility preemption arguments became the subject of intense policy
debate. Consumer advocates argued that state tort liability was necessary to
ensure patient safety, while manufacturers claimed that the threat of tort
liability limited patient access to beneficial drugs by leaving innovators
vulnerable to costly litigation and undermining the FDA’s authority.44
Courts were also split on the validity of impossibility preemption defenses.
Some courts rejected preemption defenses,45 while others were persuaded by
As impossibility preemption
defendants’ impossibility arguments.46
defenses gained traction, the FDA’s position on preemption defenses also
shifted, causing further division among courts.47 In the preamble to a January
2006 FDA rule (“2006 preamble”) and several amicus briefs filed in favor of
defendant-manufacturers, the FDA stated that the FDCA established both a
floor and a ceiling for labeling regulations, rendering all state law claims
preempted.48 As cases flooded courts and confusion mounted, it became
clear that the Supreme Court needed to weigh in on the issue.49
B. Wyeth v. Levine: A Landmark Rejection of Impossibility Preemption
In its seminal Wyeth decision in 2009, the Supreme Court held that
impossibility preemption defenses do not necessarily shield brand-name drug
manufacturers from state law liability.50 The Court created a fact-specific
test for deciding whether failure-to-warn claims against brand-name drug

44. See KATHRYN B. ARMSTRONG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10064, IS IMPOSSIBILITY
PREEMPTION IMPOSSIBLE?: FEDERAL DRUG LAW AND PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT CLAIMS 1
(2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10064.pdf [https://perma.cc/X99N-UJ3R].
45. See, e.g., Knipe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 583 F. Supp. 2d 553 (E.D. Pa. 2008)
(rejecting defendant’s impossibility preemption defense); Tucker v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (same); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F.
Supp. 2d 776 (E.D. La. 2007) (same).
46. See, e.g., Mason v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 618, 627 (C.D. Ill.
2008), rev’d, 596 F.3d 387 (7th Cir. 2010) (accepting defendant’s impossibility preemption
defense); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1291 (W.D. Okla. 2008) (accepting
defendant’s impossibility preemption defense), vacated, 606 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2010).
47. See Tucker, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 1232 (rejecting defendant’s impossibility preemption
defense and noting that the “FDA’s current position on preemption is not ‘long standing’ but
in fact a ‘180-degree reversal’ from its earlier stance” (quoting David A. Kessler & David C.
Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96
GEO. L.J. 461, 474 n.59 (2008))).
48. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934–36 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, and 601); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 19, Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S 555 (2009) (No. 06-1246); Amicus
Brief for the United States in Support of the Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, and in
Favor of Reversal of the District Court’s Order Denying Partial Summary Judgment to
Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant at 2, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir.
2002) (Nos. 02-55372 & 02-55498); Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendants-Appellees at 5–6, Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006)
(No. 06-3107).
49. See Mason, 596 F.3d at 391 (“Not surprisingly, courts began to issue contradicting
opinions, which led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Levine to decide the issue.”).
50. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009).
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manufacturers are preempted on conflict grounds.51 The decision officially
opened the door for injured plaintiffs filing state law failure-to-warn claims
and established the fundamental principle that manufacturers are responsible
for the contents of their drug labels at all times.52
1. The Facts of Wyeth
Diana Levine received two doses of Phenergan, an anti-nausea drug
manufactured by Wyeth to treat nausea caused by migraine headaches.53
Phenergan can be administered via the “IV push” method, where the drug is
injected directly into a patient’s vein, or the “IV drip” method, where the
drug is presented in a saline solution in an intravenous bag and slowly enters
a patient’s vein through a catheter.54 The drug is known to cause irreversible
gangrene if it enters an artery.55 After an IV drip dose of Phenergan failed
to relieve Levine’s nausea, a second dose was administered via the riskier IV
push method. This dose somehow entered Levine’s artery, resulting in
gangrene and the eventual amputation of Levine’s right forearm.56
Levine sued Wyeth in Vermont state court claiming that: (1) Wyeth’s
labeling was defective because it failed to instruct clinicians to use the IV
drip method, rather than the high-risk IV push method and (2) more broadly,
that Phenergan was not safe for intravenous administration.57 Wyeth argued
that Levine’s failure-to-warn claims were impliedly preempted by federal
law based on the 2006 preamble, which noted that FDA approval of a drug’s
label preempts state laws imposing liability for negligent labeling.58 Wyeth
also claimed that Phenergan labels adequately stated the risks of the IV push
method and noted that the IV drip method was the preferable method of
administration.59 Lastly, Wyeth argued that the FDA’s previous rejection of
a label change concerning risks of arterial exposure illustrated that the FDA
would have rejected stronger proposed warnings concerning the IV push
method.60
The trial court rejected Wyeth’s preemption defense, and a jury found that
Wyeth failed to provide adequate warning of the catastrophic risks of
injecting Phenergan directly into a patient’s vein.61 The court also found that
Levine’s claim was not preempted because neither Wyeth nor the FDA had

51. Id. at 571.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 558–59.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 559.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 560.
58. Id. at 560–61.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 562 (noting that the FDA instructed Wyeth to keep the verbiage in its current
label regarding intra-arterial injections).
61. Id. at 558.
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paid more than “passing attention” to the question of increased IV push
warnings.62
The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Wyeth could have
added increased warnings against IV push administration without prior FDA
approval and noting that federal labeling requirements create a floor, not a
ceiling, for state regulation.63 Wyeth appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court,
arguing that: (1) the FDA’s drug labeling judgments preempt state law
failure-to-warn claims alleging that different labels were necessary to make
drugs reasonably safe for use and (2) recognition of such state law failure-towarn claims creates an unacceptable obstacle to achieving the purposes of
Congress by unjustly substituting a lay jury’s decision for the expert
judgment of the FDA.64 Conflicting preemption rulings across the country,65
coupled with the FDA’s shifting position on the role of state tort law66
persuaded the Court to grant Wyeth’s petition for certiorari.67
2. Creating a Clear Evidence Standard
In a majority opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens,68 the Supreme
Court rejected Wyeth’s impossibility preemption defense, noting that the
FDA’s CBE regulation permitted Wyeth to supplement its IV push warnings
without FDA approval.69 The Court held that, “absent clear evidence that
the FDA would not have approved a change to Phenergan’s label,” Levine’s
claims were not preempted.70 The Court assumed that there is a presumption
against preemption and held that Wyeth failed to meet the “demanding”
impossibility preemption defense.71 As part of its analysis, the Court noted
that Wyeth failed to provide the FDA with an evaluation of the specific
dangers of the IV push method or sufficient evidence that it attempted to add
stronger warnings as required by state law but was prohibited from doing so
by the FDA.72 The Court emphasized that notwithstanding FDA approval, a
“manufacturer[] bears responsibility for the content of its label at all times.”73
Justice Stevens also rejected Wyeth’s obstacle preemption defense
because Levine’s state law claims did not stand as an obstacle to Congress’s
62. Id. at 563.
63. Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 184 (Vt. 2006).
64. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 563–64.
65. See Richard Ausness, The Impact of Wyeth v. Levine on FDA Regulation of
Prescription Drugs, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 253–54 (2010).
66. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 201, 314, and 601) (concluding that FDA approval of a drug’s label preempts state laws
imposing liability for negligent labeling).
67. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 563.
68. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Anthony Kennedy, and
Souter. Id. at 556.
69. Id. at 568–69.
70. Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 573.
72. Id. at 572–73.
73. Id. at 570–71.
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purposes in the FDCA.74 The Court held that the FDA’s 2006 preamble did
not merit deference because it conflicted with the purpose of Congress75 and
did not reflect the FDA’s long-standing position that federal law serves as
the floor for state regulation.76 Justice Stevens also noted that the lack of a
federal remedy or express preemption clause in the FDCA illustrated that
Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring
drug safety.77
3. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
While the clear evidence standard set by the majority appeared
straightforward on its face, the other opinions issued in Wyeth illustrated the
Justices’ conflicting views about what constitutes impossibility preemption
in the brand-name prescription drug context. The Justices’ diverging
understandings of statutory interpretation, separation of powers, and the role
of federal agencies all led to vastly different conclusions about whether
Levine’s claims were preempted.
Although he joined the majority opinion, Justice Breyer wrote a separate
concurrence acknowledging that federal regulations could preempt state tort
law under certain circumstances, such as when state law interferes with the
“FDA’s desire to create a drug label containing a specific set of cautions and
instructions”78 or when the state law would force drug manufacturers to
“raise prices to the point where those who are sick are unable to obtain the
drugs they need.”79 Even so, Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that the
2006 preamble did not constitute such a regulation, and Levine’s state law
claims could proceed.80
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment but wrote a separate opinion
expressing concern that the court had approved “far-reaching implied preemption doctrines.”81 He argued that impossibility preemption analysis
should turn on whether the text of state and federal laws contradict one
another.82 He also noted that a conflict may exist even if it is physically
possible to comply with both laws, such as when a federal law creates a right
(not a duty) to engage in particular behavior forbidden by state law.83 In that
case, an individual could comply with both federal and state law by refraining

74. Id. at 581.
75. Id. at 565 (“[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption
case.” (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996))); see also id. at 577.
76. Id. at 577.
77. Id. at 575.
78. Id. at 582 (Breyer, J., concurring).
79. Id. (citing Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of Product Liability on New Drug
Development, in THE LIABILITY MAZE 334, 335–36 (Peter Huber & Robert E. Litan eds.,
1991)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 583 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
82. Id. (noting that “implied pre-emption doctrines that wander far from the statutory text
are inconsistent with the Constitution”).
83. Id. at 590.
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from engaging in the behavior, even though the laws are contradictory.84
Still, Justice Thomas concluded that the text of the FDCA did not preempt
Levine’s claims because Wyeth could have strengthened Phenergan’s
warnings under the CBE regulation, and the FDCA did not provide Wyeth
with a right that state law rescinded.85 Justice Thomas also rejected the
majority’s analysis of the purposes and objectives of Congress and argued
that the majority’s broad interpretation permitted courts to find preemption
even where Congress has not expressly preempted state law and where the
text of federal and state laws are not in conflict.86
Justice Alito dissented,87 arguing that it was “demonstrably untrue” that
Phenergan “labeling did not contain a specific warning about the risks of IVpush administration” when it was administered to Levine.88 Justice Alito
reasoned that the FDA had properly considered the risks and benefits of the
IV push method and had repeatedly concluded that Phenergan was safe and
effective.89 He also noted that the majority’s holding that a jury, rather than
the FDA, holds the power to regulate warning labels for brand-name
prescription drugs was incompatible with the Court’s previous understanding
of conflict preemption.90 Justice Alito claimed that the majority opinion
“commit[ted] both factual and legal errors,”91 and that “faithful application
of [the] Court’s conflict preemption cases compels the conclusion that the
FDA’s 40-year-long effort to regulate the safety and efficacy of Phenergan
preempts [Levine’s] tort suit.”92
C. The Aftermath of Wyeth
Following Wyeth, courts were forced to make their own determinations
about what constitutes clear evidence that the FDA would have prohibited
brand-name drug manufacturers from adding stronger warnings required by
state law.93 Not surprisingly, confusion surrounding this standard led to what
some commentators regarded as “a hodgepodge of judicial opinions that have

84. Id.
85. Id. at 593.
86. Id. at 594.
87. Justice Alito was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Antonin Scalia. Id. at
604 (Alito, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 619.
89. Id. at 609.
90. Id. (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884–85 (2000)).
91. Id. at 612.
92. Id. at 610.
93. See, e.g., Mason v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“The Supreme Court [in Wyeth] . . . did not clarify what constitutes ‘clear evidence.’”);
Rheinfrank v. Abbott Lab’ys, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 749, 762 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (noting that the
Wyeth court “did not define the ‘clear evidence’ standard, nor did it suggest the level of proof
required”), aff’d, 680 F. App’x 369 (6th Cir. 2017); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 797 F. Supp. 2d
1264, 1270 (W.D. Okla. 2011) (“[A]pplication of the clear evidence standard is necessarily
fact specific.”); Reckis v. Johnson & Johnson, 28 N.E.3d 445, 457 (Mass. 2015) (“Wyeth did
not define ‘clear evidence.’”).

2020]

HEALING A FRACTURED PREEMPTION DOCTRINE

277

reached varying results.”94 For example, in 2010, on the same record and
concerning the same label, the Seventh Circuit and the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court reached opposite conclusions about whether or not
defendants showed clear evidence that the FDA would have rejected a
proposed label change to Children’s Motrin.95 Courts also split on whether
Wyeth mandated a showing that the FDA had previously rejected the exact
warning deficiency under consideration.96 Some jurisdictions held that the
clear evidence standard is satisfied when the FDA had previously rejected an
identical label change,97 while others held that such rejection was not critical
to a successful preemption defense.98 Courts also disagreed on whether the
FDA’s denial of a citizen petition or rejection of a different warning
constituted clear evidence under Wyeth99 and whether impossibility
preemption questions were questions of law for a judge or questions of fact
for a jury.100
One clear doctrine emerged after Wyeth: in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,101 the
Supreme Court held that in the context of generic drugs—as opposed to
brand-name drugs, like Phenergan in Wyeth—state law failure-to-warn
claims are always preempted by federal regulations.102 Regulation of generic
drugs is covered not by the FDCA but by the Hatch-Waxman Act.103 Under
the latter statute, passed in 1984, generic drug manufacturers can gain FDA
approval by showing equivalence to an FDA-approved brand-name drug.104
Changes under the CBE regulation are not available for generic drug labels
94. Michael M. Gallagher, Clear Evidence of Impossibility Preemption After Wyeth v.
Levine, 51 GONZ. L. REV. 439, 479 (2015).
95. Compare Robinson v. McNeil Consumer Healthcare, 615 F.3d 861, 869–70, 873 (7th
Cir. 2010) (concluding there was “clear evidence” the FDA would have rejected a proposed
warning change for Children’s Motrin), with Reckis, 28 N.E.3d at 456–60 (reaching the
opposite conclusion).
96. See Eric Lindenfeld, Brand Name Preemption: The New Frontier in Pharmaceutical
Product Liability Litigation, 72 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 636, 636 (2017).
97. See, e.g., Schedin v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132
(D. Minn. 2011) (“[T]o trigger pre-emption, a brand-name manufacturer must show that the
FDA would not have approved a proposed label change.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
In re Levaquin Prods. Liab. Litig., 700 F.3d 1161 (8th Cir. 2012).
98. See Dobbs, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1280 (holding that the defendant provided clear
evidence that the FDA would have rejected a label change relating to increased suicide risk,
despite the defendant having made no past attempts to add such warnings).
99. See Gallagher, supra note 94, at 465–68.
100. Compare S. Jersey Sanitation Co. v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance
Co., 840 F.3d 138, 143 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that “preemption determinations are questions
of law”), with In re Zofran (Ondansetron) Prods. Liab. Litig., 368 F. Supp. 3d 94, 120 (D.
Mass. 2019) (holding that “preemption presents a question of fact”).
101. 564 U.S. 604 (2011).
102. See id. at 609 (discussing failure-to-warn claims). See generally Mut. Pharm. Co. v.
Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013) (extending PLIVA’s impossibility preemption analysis for
generic manufacturers to design defect claims).
103. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
104. See id. § 102, 98 Stat. 1592–93 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A));
PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 613 (noting that generic drug manufacturers have a federal duty to copy
brand name labels exactly).
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because generic labels must be identical to their brand-name counterparts.
Therefore, it is impossible for a generic manufacturer to unilaterally add or
strengthen warnings without violating the FDCA.105 While the HatchWaxman Act streamlined the process of generic drug approvals and has led
to lower-cost drugs for consumers, the Supreme Court has “effectively
immunized” generic drug manufacturers from state law liability.106 Two
years after PLIVA, the Court issued a similarly strong impossibility
preemption ruling for a generic manufacturer in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.
v. Bartlett.107
Outside the context of generic drugs, however, it remains “exceedingly
difficult to demonstrate that any consistent principle or explanatory variable
emerges from the Supreme Court’s products liability preemption
jurisprudence.”108 This is especially problematic given the dramatic rise in
federal product liability lawsuits against pharmaceutical manufacturers over
the last several years. Between June 2018 and June 2019, 38,848 product
liability lawsuits were filed against pharmaceutical companies in federal
courts, almost tripling the amount of cases filed just five years ago.109
Moreover, out of the sixty-seven pending products liability multidistrict
litigation (MDL) proceedings today, twenty-three of them (over 34 percent)
involve pharmaceuticals.110 Persistent confusion among courts deciding
these cases called for further Supreme Court intervention to clarify the
preemption doctrine.
II. MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP. V. ALBRECHT: AN END TO THE
PREEMPTION MUDDLE?
In 2019, the Supreme Court revisited impossibility preemption in
Albrecht.111 Albrecht presented the Court with an opportunity to break its
decade-long silence on how courts should interpret Wyeth’s clear evidence
standard. Part II.A of this Note discusses the litigation leading up to the
Supreme Court’s decision. Part II.B examines Justice Breyer’s majority
opinion. Parts II.C and II.D explore Justice Thomas and Justice Alito’s
105. See generally Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472; PLIVA, 564 U.S. 604.
106. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Supreme Court’s Stealth
Return to the Common Law of Torts, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 454 (2016).
107. 570 U.S. 472 (2013).
108. Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 454 (2008).
109. See Table C-2—U.S. District Courts–Civil Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary
(June 30, 2019), U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-2/statistical-tablesfederal-judiciary/2019/06/30 [https://perma.cc/7QKY-5HUP] (last visited June 22, 2020); see
also Table C-2—U.S. District Courts–Civil Judicial Business (September 30, 2015), U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-2/judicial-business/2015/09/30 [https://perma.cc/
TRL9-QAGY] (last visited June 22, 2020) (stating that 13,939 product liability suits were
commenced in 2014).
110. See U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MDL STATISTICS REPORT—
DISTRIBUTION OF PENDING MDL DOCKETS BY DISTRICT 1–4 (2019), https://www.jpml.
uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDLs_by_District-November-19-2019.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XV47-PA6J].
111. 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019).
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concurring opinions, which, as in Wyeth, illustrate the Justices’ conflicting
views on preemption and provide crucial insight for lower courts tasked with
deciding preemption defenses. Finally, Part II.E identifies three interpretive
issues arising from the Albrecht majority that must be resolved to ensure a
uniform doctrine.
A. The Fosamax Litigation
Beginning in 2011, Merck Sharp & Dohme Corporation (“Merck”) began
to face what would ultimately become over a thousand lawsuits relating to
Fosamax, its bisphosphonate osteoporosis drug for postmenopausal
women.112 Plaintiffs in these cases alleged that Fosamax caused them to
suffer atypical femoral fractures and that Merck’s FDA-approved Fosamax
label failed to adequately warn of the risk of these fractures.113 More than
260 of these cases are still pending in federal court today as part of an
MDL.114 A complete understanding of the Albrecht decision requires a
review of the drug’s label and the litigation leading up to the Supreme Court’s
decision.
1. The Evolution of the Fosamax Label
When the FDA approved Fosamax for the treatment of osteoporosis in
postmenopausal women in 1995, it did not require Merck to include warnings
about bone fractures.115 However, letters, meeting minutes, and internal
memoranda reveal that Merck knew as early as 1990 that continuous use of
Fosamax could make bones susceptible to serious deficiencies and certain
types of fractures.116 Between 1990 and 2008, case studies and reports
shared with Merck revealed a possible connection between bisphosphonate
use and atypical femoral fractures.117 A particularly striking example
occurred in 2005, when Merck received a report from Dr. Joseph Lane, a
renowned expert in metabolic bone disorders such as osteoporosis.118 Dr.
Lane’s report stated that 100 percent of his patients who were prescribed
Fosamax experienced atypical femoral fractures.119 In fact, doctors at Lane’s

112. The Fosamax lawsuits include two MDLs and a multicounty litigation (MCL). The
second Fosamax MDL will be the focus of this Note. There were 269 active cases in this
MDL as of July 16, 2020. U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MDL STATISTICS
REPORT—DISTRIBUTION OF PENDING MDL DOCKETS BY ACTIONS PENDING 1 (2020), https://
www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_Actions_Pending-July16-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SD9-5CJP] [hereinafter JULY 2020 MDL STATISTICS REPORT].
113. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1675.
114. See JULY 2020 MDL STATISTICS REPORT, supra note 112, at 1.
115. Brief for Respondents at 11, Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (No. 17-290).
116. Joint Appendix (Volume I of II) at 100, Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (No. 17-290).
117. Id. at 125–26.
118. Brief of Amici Curiae Joseph Lane, M.D., and Vincent Vigorita, M.D., in Support of
Respondents at 2–3, Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (No. 17-290) [hereinafter Lane and Vigorita
Brief].
119. Id. at 18; see also id. at 3 (noting that no fewer than twenty-five patients taking
Fosamax suffered from atypical femoral fractures).
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hospital referred to these fractures as “Fosamax fractures.”120 Dr. Lane noted
that his patients’ injuries were not typical stress fractures and emphasized
that his patients taking Fosamax were experiencing fractures that orthopedic
physicians had not previously seen.121
Although Merck was aware of these studies and claimed to have kept the
FDA informed of all relevant information,122 it is unclear if Merck revealed
the true nature of the problem to the agency.123 Merck informed the FDA of
studies concerning “stress fractures” but did not specify that the femoral
fractures at issue were distinct from typical stress fractures.124 In June 2008,
the FDA alerted Merck that it was “aware of reports regarding” atypical
femoral fractures in patients using bisphosphonates, citing several of the key
articles written on the issue.125 To address “concern[s] about this developing
safety signal,” the FDA requested that Merck submit its own investigative
reports on the connection between Fosamax and femoral fracture risks.126
After submitting its materials, Merck requested a PAS label change in
2008.127 The proposed label change added mentions of fractures to both the
“Warnings and Precautions” and “Adverse Reactions” sections of the
Fosamax label.128 Merck proposed referencing “‘low-energy femoral shaft
fracture[s]’ in the Adverse Reactions section, and cross-referencing a longer
discussion” of the fractures in the warnings and precautions section.129
Under current federal regulations, warnings and precautions labels must
describe “clinically significant adverse reactions,” including any that are
“serious even if infrequent.”130 Adverse reactions labels must describe “the
overall adverse reaction profile of the drug based on the entire safety
database,” including a list of all “undesirable effect[s] reasonably associated
with use of a drug.”131
While the first sentence of Merck’s proposed warning and precautions
label stated, “[l]ow-energy fractures of the subtrochanteric and proximal
femoral shaft have been reported in a small number of bisphosphonate-

120. Id. at 15.
121. Id.
122. See Brief for Petitioner at 8, Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (No. 17-290) (noting that Merck
brought the fracture considerations to the FDA’s attention throughout the 1990s and that in
“2008, Merck provided the FDA with a periodic safety update that included over 30 pages of
information regarding these fractures”).
123. Joint Appendix (Volume I of II), supra note 116, at 143 (“In my opinion, it appears
that Merck was attempting to confound the true nature of the association between Fosamax
and [atypical femoral fractures] by identifying numerous potential risk factors, very few of
which were actually grounded in the available data.”).
124. See Lane and Vigorita Brief, supra note 118, at 1 (“Stress fractures are
radiographically and symptomatically different from atypical femur fractures associated with
long-term use of Fosamax.”).
125. Joint Appendix (Volume I of II), supra note 116, at 280–81.
126. Id. at 280.
127. Brief for Respondents, supra note 115, at 11.
128. Id. at 11–12.
129. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1674 (2019).
130. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i) (2019).
131. Id. § 201.57(c)(7).
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treated patients,” the remainder of the proposed warning referred to the
fractures as “stress fractures.”132 The proposed label also noted: “The
number of reports of this condition is very low, and stress fractures with
similar clinical features also have occurred in patients not treated with
bisphosphonate.”133 According to Merck, it was “not possible . . . to
establish whether treatment with [Fosamax] increase[d] the risk of [femoral
fractures],” but Merck found it “important to include an appropriate
statement about them in the product label” because of the temporal
association between these fractures and bisphosphonate use.134
In 2009, the FDA sent Merck a “‘Complete Response’ letter,” granting in
part and denying in part Merck’s application.135 The FDA approved the
addition of “‘low energy femoral shaft and subtrochanteric fractures’ to the
Adverse Reactions section” because “‘there is some basis to believe’
Fosamax causes those fractures.”136 However, the FDA ultimately found
that Merck’s justification for elevating the warning to the warnings and
precautions section was “inadequate,” because “[d]iscussion of the risk
factors for stress fractures is not warranted and is not adequately supported”
by evidence.137 The FDA offered Merck an opportunity to “resubmit” its
application and to “fully address” the Fosamax deficiencies.138 Instead,
Merck withdrew its PAS application, added the approved femoral fracture
language to the adverse reactions label through the CBE process, and did not
resubmit its warnings and precautions label application or attempt to add
further atypical femoral fracture language to the Fosamax label.139
In March 2010, the FDA announced it was working with an outside task
force to gather information on the risk of femoral fractures because data
submitted by Merck and other manufacturers did “not show[] a clear
connection between bisphosphonate use and a risk of atypical
subtrochanteric femur fractures.”140 In October 2010, based on the task
force’s report, the FDA required all bisphosphonate manufacturers to add the
risk of atypical femoral fractures to the warnings and precautions sections of
drugs’ labels, because “these atypical fractures may be related to longterm . . . bisphosphonate use.”141 After this label change was mandated,
hundreds of plaintiffs filed state law failure-to-warn suits claiming they were
injured because of Merck’s concealment of the Fosamax fracture risk
between 1995 and 2010.142
132. Brief for Respondents, supra note 115, at 12.
133. Id.
134. Joint Appendix (Volume II of II) at 478, Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (No. 17-290).
135. Brief for Respondents, supra note 115, at 15.
136. Id. at 15–16 (quoting 21 C.F.R § 201.57(c)(7)).
137. Id. at 16.
138. Joint Appendix (Volume II of II), supra note 134, at 512.
139. Brief for Respondents, supra note 115, at 16.
140. Joint Appendix (Volume II of II), supra note 134, at 519.
141. Joint Appendix (Volume I of II), supra note 116, at 246–47.
142. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d 268, 271 (3d. Cir.
2017) (“Beginning in 2010, hundreds of plaintiffs filed personal-injury suits against the drug
manufacturer Merck Sharp & Dohme, alleging that the osteoporosis drug Fosamax caused
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2. Procedural History
In 2011, the failure-to-warn actions against Merck involving atypical
femoral fractures were consolidated as an MDL in the District of New Jersey
and several cases were selected for trial.143 Just as Wyeth had argued ten
years earlier, Merck claimed that plaintiffs’ state law failure-to-warn claims
were preempted by FDA regulations.144 Merck argued that the FDA’s
rejection of its PAS submission for an increased warning against “stress
fractures” in the warning and precautions section of the Fosamax label
demonstrated that the FDA would not have approved a label concerning
atypical femoral fractures.145
The first bellwether trial involved Bernadette Glynn, a patient who took
Fosamax from 2002 to 2009 and suffered from an atypical femoral fracture
that required surgical repair in 2009.146 Glynn claimed that her use of
Fosamax caused this fracture.147 To ensure that any and all facts relevant to
preemption would appear on the record, the judge deferred a ruling on the
preemption issue until after the jury made its decision.148
In June 2013, after considering the parties’ additional briefing, evidence,
arguments, and the trial record, the district court dismissed Glynn’s claim
based on federal preemption, holding that under Wyeth, clear evidence
existed that “the FDA would not have approved a stronger warning to the
Precautions section of the [Fosamax] label.”149 To show that no label change
would have been accepted, the district court relied on: the FDA’s rejection
of the warnings Merck proposed for the warnings and precautions section of
the Fosamax label, the FDA’s response letter to Merck cautioning that
stronger warnings could make Fosamax “misbranded,” and the fact that the
FDA never required Merck to submit new language or a different label
change.150 After the dismissal, Merck moved for an order to show cause why
the claims of all other plaintiffs with injuries prior to the date of Glynn’s
injury should not also be dismissed pursuant to the court’s preemption
ruling.151 The district court agreed and entered summary judgment for
Merck.152
them to suffer serious thigh bone fractures.”), vacated sub nom. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp.
v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019).
143. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 951 F. Supp. 2d 695, 697
(D.N.J. 2013), vacated, 852 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 2017), vacated sub nom. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct.
1668.
144. Id. at 702.
145. Id. at 703.
146. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-5304, 08-08, 2013
WL 1558697, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 11, 2013).
147. Id. at *7.
148. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium): Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2243, No. 115304, 08-08, 2014 WL 1266994, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2014), vacated, 852 F.3d 268 (3d. Cir.
2017).
149. See In re Fosamax, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 700.
150. Id. at 703–04.
151. See In re Fosamax, 2014 WL 1266994, at *1.
152. See id. at *17.
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Merck’s victory was short-lived. Consumers of Fosamax appealed, and
the Third Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that Wyeth required a
heightened “clear and convincing” standard of proof153 and that plaintiffs had
“produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the FDA
would have approved a properly-worded warning about the risk of thigh
fractures—or at the very least, to conclude that the odds of FDA rejection
were less than highly probable.”154 The Third Circuit also rejected Merck’s
claim that preemption questions should be decided by judges rather than
juries.155
Merck petitioned the Supreme Court, “ask[ing] the Court to decide
whether Merck’s case and others like it ‘must . . . go to a jury’ to determine
whether the FDA, in effect, has disapproved a state-law-required labeling
change.”156 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.157
B. Justice Breyer’s Opinion for the Court
The Supreme Court ruled 9-0 that the availability of the impossibility
preemption defense is a question of law to be decided by the judge, not the
jury.158 In an opinion by Justice Breyer,159 the Supreme Court promptly
rejected the Third Circuit’s analysis and remanded the case back to the Third
Circuit.160
The decisive question before the Court was whether impossibility
preemption defenses should be decided by judges as a matter of law.161 The
Court unanimously held that preemption is a question of law for judges to
decide.162 The Court reasoned that judges are “better equipped” than juries
“to evaluate the nature and scope of an agency’s determination” and “to
interpret agency decisions in light of the governing statutory and regulatory
context.”163 The Court also noted that deciding preemption questions as a
matter of law would lead to “greater uniformity,” which is especially
important when questions involve “the scope and effect of federal agency

153. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d 268, 285 (3d. Cir.
2017), vacated sub nom. Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019).
154. Id. at 271.
155. Id. at 290.
156. See Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1676; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Albrecht,
139 S. Ct. 1668 (No. 17-290) (“This petition is the ideal vehicle in which to lay down a legal
marker for when a failure-to-warn claim is properly preempted in the branded drug context,
and thus revive the preemption defense that courts since [Wyeth] have narrowed virtually out
of existence.”).
157. Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 138 S. Ct. 2705 (2018).
158. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1680–81.
159. Justices Ginsburg, Gorsuch, Sotomayor, and Thomas joined in the opinion. Id. at
1671.
160. Id. at 1680–81.
161. Id. at 1679–80.
162. Id. at 1679.
163. Id. at 1680.
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action.”164 Justice Breyer noted that even if factual determinations need to
be made, the “‘better positioned’ decisionmaker is the judge.”165
As part of its analysis, the Court accepted the opportunity to “elaborate
Wyeth’s requirements along the way.”166 Although this analysis was not
directly connected to the question before the Court, and could be considered
dicta, uncertainty surrounding the correct application of Wyeth was a major
reason for the Court granting certiorari.167 Therefore, Justice Breyer’s
analysis of Wyeth is a crucial part of the Court’s opinion, and the framework
Justice Breyer lays out must be followed by courts deciding future
impossibility preemption defenses.
The Court noted that in cases comparable to Wyeth,
“clear evidence” is evidence that shows the court that the drug
manufacturer fully informed the FDA of the justifications for the warning
required by state law, and that the FDA, in turn, informed the drug
manufacturer that the FDA would not approve a change to the drug’s label
to include that warning.168

The Court stated that these conclusions “flow from . . . precedents on
impossibility preemption and the . . . regulatory scheme that we reviewed in
Wyeth.”169 The Court also clarified that this definition of clear evidence is
not a heightened evidentiary standard but simply a requirement that the court
consider “whether the relevant federal and state laws ‘irreconcilably
conflic[t].’”170
The Court also elaborated on Wyeth’s discussion of CBE regulations,
noting that these regulations “permit[] drug manufacturers to change a label
to ‘reflect newly acquired information’ if the changes ‘add or strengthen a . . .
warning’ for which there is ‘evidence of a causal association’” without prior
FDA approval.171 While the FDA can ultimately reject CBE submissions if
manufacturers cannot show a change is based on reasonable evidence, CBE
regulations permit changes in the interim. Thus, a manufacturer “will not
ordinarily be able to show that there is an actual conflict between state and
federal law such that it was impossible to comply with both.”172
Lastly, the Court noted that because the Supremacy Clause only gives
“supreme” status to “the Laws of the United States,”173 “pre-emption takes
place ‘only when and if [the agency] is acting within the scope of its
congressionally delegated authority.’”174 The Court provided several
164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996)).
166. Id. at 1676.
167. Id. (“In light of differences and uncertainties among the courts of appeals and state
supreme courts in respect to the application of Wyeth, we granted certiorari.”).
168. Id. at 1672.
169. Id. at 1678.
170. Id. at 1679 (alteration in original) (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S.
654, 659 (1982)).
171. Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) (2019)).
172. Id.
173. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
174. Id. (quoting New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 18 (2002)).
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examples of actions that fall under this authority, including notice and
comment rulemaking, formal rejection of a warning label that would have
been adequate under state law, “or . . . other agency action carrying the force
of law.”175
Although Justice Breyer’s opinion suggested that Merck’s preemption
defense failed because of the availability of CBE label changes, the Court did
not answer the preemption question. Instead, Justice Breyer remanded the
case to the Third Circuit to fully consider the clarified standards outlined in
the opinion and to treat the preemption question as one of law rather than
fact.176 It is also possible that the Court remanded the case because it was
not clear that enough Justices would reach the same conclusion about
whether or not Merck’s preemption defense could succeed. Although the
judgment was unanimous, just as in Wyeth, the concurring opinions in
Albrecht demonstrate enduring divides concerning how preemption
principles apply in this context.177
C. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence
Although he concurred in the judgment, Justice Thomas explained in a
separate opinion that Merck’s preemption defense should fail as a matter of
law.178 Justice Thomas remained skeptical of impossibility preemption as
the best test for determining whether a conflict exists between state and
federal law.179 As in Wyeth, he relied on the “original meaning” of the
Supremacy Clause to argue that preemption questions should be based on
whether state and federal law are in “logical contradiction.”180 Nevertheless,
Justice Thomas argued that Merck’s defense failed under either
evaluation.181 Thomas found that state and federal law were not in logical
contradiction because FDA approval does not shield a drug from being
deemed unsafe by later federal action or the application of state law.182
Justice Thomas also argued it was not impossible for Merck to comply with
both state and federal law because “Merck point[ed] to no statute, regulation,
or other agency action with the force of law that would have prohibited it
from complying with its alleged state-law duties.”183 He went further than
the majority and concluded that the FDA’s 2009 response letter and other
agency communications suggesting the FDA would have denied a future
label change were insufficient to preempt plaintiffs’ claims because
“hypothetical agency action is not ‘Law,’” and “Merck’s belief that the FDA

175. Id.
176. Id. at 1680–81.
177. See infra Parts II.C, II.D.
178. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1681 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[E]ven under our impossibility
precedents, Merck’s pre-emption defense fails.”).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1681–82.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1683–84.
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would have eventually rejected a CBE application does not make an earlier
CBE change impossible.”184
D. Justice Alito’s Concurrence
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, also
concurred in the judgment, agreeing that impossibility preemption is a
question of law.185 However, unlike Justice Thomas, Justice Alito argued
that Merck’s preemption defense would likely succeed on remand.186 Justice
Alito worried that the majority provided a “skewed summary” of the law that
would mislead lower courts deciding preemption defenses.187 In particular,
Justice Alito noted that a statutory provision enacted after the underlying
events in Wyeth might impact the Third Circuit’s preemption analysis on
remand.188 Under 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4)(A), the FDA has a duty to initiate
a label change “[i]f the Secretary becomes aware of new information . . . that
the Secretary determines should be included in the labeling of the drug.”189
Because the FDA has the burden to take action under these circumstances,
FDA inaction may be sufficient to establish that it disapproved of additional
warnings.190 As Justice Alito noted, this mechanism does not “require the
FDA to communicate to the relevant drug manufacturer that a label change
is unwarranted; instead, the FDA could simply consider the new information
and decide not to act.”191
Justice Alito also noted that the majority made no mention of the
possibility that the FDA would have accepted a PAS application instead of a
CBE supplement where significant questions exist as to whether to modify
existing labeling.192 Justice Alito agreed with Justice Breyer that Wyeth’s
use of the phrase “‘clear evidence’ was merely a rhetorical flourish” and did
not espouse a heightened evidentiary standard.193
Lastly, Justice Alito’s concurrence illustrates factual disputes among the
Justices. Justice Alito criticized the majority’s “one-sided account,” noting
that the FDA was aware of the atypical femoral fracture issue for years,
regularly communicated with Merck about these risks, and studied all
relevant information before instructing healthcare professionals and patients
to continue using Fosamax.194 Justice Alito noted that the FDA itself has
taken the position that its “decision not to require a label change prior to
[conducting its own analysis] reflected the FDA’s ‘determin[ation]’ that a
184. Id. at 1683.
185. Id. at 1684 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
186. Id. at 1684–85.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1684.
190. See generally Douglas G. Smith, A Shift in the Preemption Landscape?, 87 TENN. L.
REV. 213 (2019).
191. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1684 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
192. Id. at 1685.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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new warning” should not be added to the drug’s label.195 According to
Justice Alito, state law failure-to-warn claims are preempted if the FDA
“simply consider[ed] the new information and decid[ed] not to act”196
because federal agencies are entitled to a “presumption” that they properly
follow federal law.197
E. Interpretive Issues Raised by Justice Breyer’s Framework
The three opinions in Albrecht highlight that, despite the Court’s
unanimous judgment, members of the Court hold divergent views on the
powers of the administrative state and the role of judicial scrutiny in federal
preemption cases.198 While the majority chose not to answer the preemption
question, Justice Thomas argued that Merck’s impossibility preemption
defense should fail as a matter of law,199 and Justice Alito was convinced
that Merck’s preemption defense should succeed.200 Lower courts tasked
with applying the preemption framework outlined by Justice Breyer can use
the concurring opinions to inform their analysis when determining whether
defendant-manufacturers have satisfied Wyeth’s clear evidence requirement.
When viewed collectively, the opinions in Albrecht and the preemption case
law following Wyeth generate several questions about Justice Breyer’s
framework.
Three core interpretative issues arise from Justice Breyer’s opinion. To
succeed on an impossibility preemption defense, defendants must know: (1)
what it means for a brand-name drug manufacturer to “fully inform[]”201 the
FDA, (2) what it means for federal and state law to “irreconcilably
conflic[t],”202 and (3) what agency actions are included in the FDA’s
“congressionally delegated authority.”203 Courts must agree on the answers
to these questions in order to decide preemption defenses as a matter of law.
This is no easy task. The fact that the Supreme Court remanded the case,
rather than simply reinstating the district court’s original holding, only
highlights the difficulty of convergence on application. The Third Circuit
recently remanded the case back to the district court, tasking the district court
judge with deciding whether state law claims are preempted in the remaining
Fosamax lawsuits.204

195. Id.
196. Id. at 1684.
197. See id.; see also United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926) (“[I]n
the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [federal agencies] have
properly discharged their official duties.”).
198. See supra Parts II.A–II.C.
199. See Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1681–82 (Thomas, J., concurring).
200. See id. at 1684–85 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
201. Id. at 1672 (majority opinion).
202. Id. at 1679.
203. Id.
204. Order, In re: Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 14-1900 et al.,
MDL No. 2243, at 1 (3d Cir. Nov. 25, 2019) [hereinafter Remand Order] (“[T]hese cases shall
be remanded to the District Court . . . to determine in the first instance whether the plaintiffs’
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III. HOW SHOULD LOWER COURTS IMPLEMENT JUSTICE BREYER’S
FRAMEWORK?
Part III addresses the gaps left by Justice Breyer’s clear evidence
framework. Part III.A discusses what it means for a defendant-manufacturer
to “fully inform[] the FDA of the justifications for the warning required by
state law”205 by looking at impossibility preemption jurisprudence since
Wyeth and exploring the relationship between impossibility preemption and
fraud-on-the-agency claims. Part III.B examines what it means for state and
federal laws to irreconcilably conflict by analyzing how the adequacy of
proposed label changes and the broad scope of the CBE regulation impact
defendants’ abilities to comply with both state and federal law. Finally, Part
III.C explores the scope of the FDA’s congressionally delegated authority by
looking at which agency actions have been held to carry the force of law.
A. The Meaning of the “Fully Informed” Requirement
A major piece of Justice Breyer’s definition of clear evidence is evidence
that shows the court that the drug manufacturer fully informed the FDA of
the reasons for the warning required by state law and that the FDA, in
response to this information, informed the manufacturer that the FDA would
not approve a change to the drug’s label to include such a warning.206
1. Applicability of the Fully Informed Requirement
First, courts must decide when the duty to fully inform the FDA applies.
The Supreme Court prefaced the clear evidence requirement with the
language “in a case like Wyeth.”207 The Tenth Circuit has interpreted this
language to mean that a drug manufacturer’s duty to fully inform the FDA
only applies to cases involving Wyeth’s particular circumstances.208 Under
this narrow view, defendants are only required to show clear evidence that
the FDA was fully informed of justifications for warnings required by state
law when a proposed label change is in dispute, as in Wyeth and Albrecht.209
In Cerveny v. Aventis,210 the Tenth Circuit held that the FDA’s rejection of a
citizen petition, rather than a proposed label change, did not require the
defendant-manufacturer to show that it had fully informed the FDA under the
clear evidence analysis and that, given this full information, the FDA would
have rejected a unilateral label change, as in Wyeth.211
state law claims are preempted by federal law under the standards described by the Supreme
Court in its opinion.”) .
205. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1678.
206. Id. at 1672.
207. Id. at 1678.
208. See Cerveny v. Aventis, Inc., 783 F. App’x 804, 808 n.9 (10th Cir. 2019) (noting that
because “Aventis argues a different ground [than Wyeth] to show that the FDA would have
rejected the Cervenys’ proposed warning . . . Aventis is not left to show clear evidence that
the FDA would have rejected any unilateral label change under the CBE regulation”).
209. See supra Parts I–II.
210. 783 F. App’x 804 (10th Cir. 2019).
211. See id. at 808 n.9.
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Despite the Tenth Circuit’s view, plaintiffs will likely argue that courts
should adopt a broader understanding of “a case like Wyeth” to include
situations where the FDA was “fully informed” by someone other than the
defendant, such as by a third-party in a citizen petition.212 That is exactly
what the plaintiffs argued in Cerveny.213 However, the Tenth Circuit’s swift
rejection of this “key difference” between Cerveny and Wyeth shows that
courts may be predisposed to adopt a restricted understanding of what
triggers the clear evidence requirement.214 While this reading of the clear
evidence framework will restrain the viability of state law failure-to-warn
claims, neither Albrecht nor Wyeth involved a citizen’s petition or other thirdparty method of informing the FDA, so it is unlikely that the Supreme Court
intended the doctrine to extend outside of the proposed warning context.
2. Ways to Satisfy the Fully Informed Requirement
After establishing when defendants must fully inform the FDA, it must be
decided how they can do so. As the Third Circuit noted, some courts “have
decided preemption cases by simply treating the facts of Wyeth as a yardstick:
if the evidence for FDA rejection in a given case is less compelling than the
manufacturer’s evidence in Wyeth . . . the manufacturer’s preemption
defense fails.”215 Other courts have “exhaustively survey[ed] the post-Wyeth
case law and . . . test[ed] the facts of a particular case against prior
decisions.”216 Because neither approach “clarifies or builds out”217 the
impossibility preemption doctrine, courts deciding impossibility preemption
defenses must instead adopt a uniform understanding of what it means to
“fully inform[] the FDA of the justifications for the warning required by state
law.”218 Without such uniformity, Justice Breyer’s framework cannot alert
potential defendants of what to provide the FDA in order to avoid state law
tort liability and cannot instruct lower court judges tasked with deciding
preemption defenses as a matter of law. Prior Supreme Court jurisprudence
and the concurring opinions in Albrecht offer important clues to address this
inquiry.
212. An FDA citizen petition is a vehicle for individuals and organizations to request that
the FDA make changes to health policy, such as removing a drug from the market or altering
a drug’s label. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(q); see also Michelle Yearly, Tenth Circuit Finally Shuts
the Door Completely on Cerveny, DRUG & DEVICE L. BLOG (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2019/08/tenth-circuit-finally-shuts-the-doorcompletely-on-cerevny.html [https://perma.cc/6E99-XBB3].
213. Cerveny, 783 F. App’x at 808 n.9 (“Specifically, [plaintiffs] contend that Albrecht
‘dictates that only labeling changes sought by the manufacturer can lead to preemption,’ and
that ‘[the defendant] never sought the changes proposed by the [plaintiffs].’” (emphasis added)
(quoting Letter from Adam S. Davis, Couns. for Plaintiffs/Appellants, to Elisabeth Shumaker,
Clerk of U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the Tenth Cir. 1 (May 28, 2019))).
214. Id. (“We see nothing in Wyeth or Albrecht excluding Aventis from justifying
preemption on this basis.”).
215. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d 268, 284 (3d. Cir.
2017), vacated sub nom. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1678.
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a. What Does Not Fully Inform the FDA?
Deciphering what fully informs the FDA requires analyzing what the
Supreme Court and lower courts applying Wyeth and its progeny have
determined falls short of this requirement. For example, in Wyeth, the Court
held that Wyeth failed to fully inform the FDA because it failed to provide
the agency with “an evaluation or analysis concerning the specific dangers
posed by the IV-push method.”219 More recently, federal courts have found
that the FDA’s failure to mandate a warning does not show that the
manufacturer fully informed the FDA because a manufacturer always
remains responsible for the contents of its label.220 Post-Albrecht, one state
court has held that, in “misbranding avoidance” cases like Wyeth, defendants
cannot claim they have fully informed the FDA unless they “have fully
disclosed the need for the additional warning, only to be met with FDA
refusal.”221
The Albrecht concurrences provide further insight as to what does not
satisfy this information requirement. Justice Thomas noted that Merck’s
preemption defense should fail as a matter of law because it offered “no
statute, regulation, or other agency action with the force of law that would
have prohibited it from complying with its alleged state-law duties.”222
Justice Alito, however, argued that the FDA’s “extensive communication
with Merck during the relevant period” demonstrated that the agency was
fully informed of the risks of Fosamax and nonetheless determined that a
label change was unnecessary until the FDA conducted its own analysis in
2010.223
On remand, the district court must resolve this factual dispute and decide
whether Merck’s correspondence provided the FDA with all relevant
information about the justifications for state law warnings regarding atypical
femoral fractures.
b. Does Evidence the FDA Previously Accepted Suffice?
Courts must also discern whether Albrecht enables plaintiffs to argue that
evidence that the FDA previously accepted as adequate fails to fully inform
the agency. This is especially relevant to Justice Gorsuch’s “moral hazard”
concern that brand-name drug manufacturers will attempt to “inform” the
FDA by flooding the agency with so much information that it becomes

219. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 (2009).
220. See Mason v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 396 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the FDA’s inaction in failing to mandate a warning about a drug’s risk of suicide does not
show that defendant provided “clear evidence that the FDA would have rejected a label change
warning about the risk of suicide by young adults”).
221. A.Y. v. Janssen Pharm. Inc., 224 A.3d 1, 16–17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) (holding that
the defendant “did not make such a showing of full disclosure to the FDA during the relevant
time”).
222. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1683–84 (Thomas, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 1685 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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impossible for agency officials to adequately understand a drug’s risks.224
Information accompanying proposed label changes should not contain false
information or be crafted in the hopes that a proposed label will be rejected,
thereby shielding manufacturers from future state law failure-to-warn claims.
In Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee,225 the Supreme Court held
that a private plaintiff’s fraud claim predicated on a defendant’s fraudulent
violation of FDA reporting requirements was impliedly preempted by the
FDCA because such claims “inevitably conflict with the FDA’s
responsibility to police fraud.”226 Armed with this holding, defendantmanufacturers have successfully argued that strict limitations on fraud-onthe-agency claims preclude plaintiffs from arguing that the FDA’s basis for
rejecting or accepting a label change was insufficient.227 State law tort
claims based on speculative arguments about what the FDA or a defendantmanufacturer could have done differently have also been held preempted.228
Applying Buckman broadly, some courts have held that any state law
claims based on a defendant’s communications with the FDA are
preempted.229 The district court in the Fosamax litigation adopted such a
broad interpretation, holding that plaintiffs’ claims that Merck intentionally
withheld information related to atypical femoral fractures could not
proceed.230 Although the Buckman issue in the Fosamax litigation was not
224. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 13.
225. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
226. Id. at 350.
227. See, e.g., D.W.K, Jr. v. Abbott Lab’ys, Inc. (In re Depakote), 87 F. Supp. 3d 916, 922
(S.D. Ill. 2015) (holding that plaintiff’s claim that defendant “deliberately omitted”
information from FDA submissions was “unavailing” to prevent preemption); In re Incretin
Mimetics Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 13md2452, 2014 WL 4987877, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2014)
(“[P]laintiffs’ assertions that there are ‘reasons to believe [pancreatic] cancers were not
correctly reported and were under-reported’ and that information was ‘withheld by Defendants
from the FDA’ are fraud-on-the-FDA claims expressly preempted by Buckman.”); In re
Baycol Prods. Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1053 (D. Minn. 2007) (holding that “any evidence
offered only to show that the FDA was misled or that evidence was intentionally concealed
from the FDA would be excluded” under Buckman).
228. See, e.g., Willis v. Abbott Lab’ys, No. 15-cv-00057, 2017 WL 5988215, at *8 (W.D.
Ky. Dec. 1, 2017) (“[A]ny speculation as to what the FDA may have done had [the defendantmanufacturer] performed certain testing remains just that: speculation. Therefore, the Court
rejects this argument.”); Rheinfrank v. Abbott Lab’ys, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 749, 767 (S.D.
Ohio 2015) (dismissing plaintiff’s argument that “if [the defendant-manufacturer] had funded
or conducted studies that generated subsequently published data, those studies would have
generated the same data sooner” and the FDA would not have rejected the warning they
sought).
229. See Bader Farms, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., No. 16-CV-299, 2017 WL 633815, at *3
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 16, 2017) (noting that Buckman prevents “collateral attack[s] on the validity
of [a federal agency’s] decision”); see also James M. Beck, “Fully Informing” the FDA, DRUG
& DEVICE L. BLOG (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2019/09/fullyinforming-the-fda.html [https://perma.cc/TM3G-HA55].
230. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2243, 08-08, 2014
WL 1266994, at *16–17 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2014) (“[W]hile Plaintiffs were able to find an expert
to agree with their contention that Merck should have acted differently . . . Plaintiffs’
contention appears to be a fraud-on-the-FDA theory which was rejected by the Supreme Court
in Buckman.”), vacated, 852 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 2017), reversed, Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp.
v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019).
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questioned on appeal, the district court’s extension of Buckman was
problematically aggressive; a narrower view of Buckman should be adopted
by lower courts deciding impossibility preemption questions where agency
fraud is a concern. Construed narrowly, Buckman speaks only to
circumstances in which a plaintiff raises a stand-alone, state-based claim of
fraud-on-the-agency.231 Several courts, including the Second Circuit, have
adopted this limited understanding.232 In Desiano v. Warner-Lambert &
Co.,233 a case that raises similar issues to those in Albrecht,234 plaintiffs
claimed they had evidence that Warner-Lambert, the defendantmanufacturer, engaged in intentional withholding and misrepresentation of
important safety information about Rezulin, a diabetes drug.235 Using
Buckman as a shield, Warner-Lambert argued that plaintiffs’ fraud-on-theFDA claims were preempted.236 While this deft argument succeeded at the
district court level, Judge Guido Calabresi rejected the applicability of
Buckman on appeal, holding that Buckman only applies to stand-alone fraudon-the-agency claims.237 Judge Calabresi noted that because the Rezulin
case involved failure-to-warn claims traditionally regulated by the state, a
presumption against preemption applies.238 No such presumption applied in
Buckman. Judge Calabresi also noted that the fraud-on-the-agency issue in
Desiano served as an exception to a regulatory compliance defense under
state law, whereas in Buckman, the fraud-on-the-agency issue was the cause
of the entire action.239 Warner-Lambert petitioned the Supreme Court.240
However, in reaching a 4-4 decision (with Chief Justice Roberts recusing
himself), the Court merely affirmed with no precedential effect.241 A circuit

231. Catherine M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
841, 845 (2008).
232. See, e.g., Holley v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 379 F. Supp. 3d 809, 825 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
(“[W]here ‘failure-to-warn claims . . . [do] not arise solely by virtue’ of federal law, there is
no preemption under Buckman because ‘there is no suggestion that Congress intended to
displace traditional tort law by making all policing of medical labels and warnings the
exclusive province of the FDA.’” (quoting McClellan v. I-Flow Corp., 776 F.3d 1035, 1040–
41 (9th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original))); In re Zofran (Ondansetron) Prods. Liab. Litig.,
368 F. Supp. 3d 94, 120 (D. Mass. 2019) (“It therefore appears that Buckman does not apply
in the present circumstances.”).
233. 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court sub nom.
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 552 U.S. 440 (2008).
234. Unlike in Albrecht, Desiano involved a state statute that expressly contained a fraud
exception. See Desiano, 467 F.3d at 87.
235. Id. at 88.
236. Id. at 93. Defendants argued that under Buckman, the state’s fraud exception to its
regulatory compliance statute also had no teeth. Id. at 88.
237. Id. at 94–95.
238. Id. at 93–94.
239. Id. at 96; see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and
Preemption, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1757 (2012) (containing an extensive theoretical defense of
Judge Calabresi’s Desiano opinion).
240. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13–23, Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 552 U.S. 440
(2008) (No. 06-1498).
241. See Warner-Lambert Co., 552 U.S. at 440 (“The judgment is affirmed by an equally
divided Court.”).
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split on the issue remains,242 and no clear pattern has emerged among lower
courts.243
In his concurring opinion in Buckman, Justice Stevens advocated for a
middle ground approach, arguing that fraud-on-the-agency claims should
proceed “only when [they] are supported by an antecedent agency
determination of fraud.”244 As torts scholar Professor Catherine Sharkey has
argued, this approach best balances state and federal interests, allowing
federal agencies and state tort law to work in tandem.245 This approach also
ensures that fraud-on-the-agency claims will be preempted only if they would
“encroach upon,” as opposed to “supplement and facilitate[] the federal
enforcement scheme.”246
The Albrecht majority and concurring opinions do not mention Buckman
or fraud-on-the-agency concerns, which several commentators have flagged
These commentators claim that “any
as a careless oversight.247
determination in a state-law-based case of whether the FDA was ‘fully
informed’ about anything runs headlong into Buckman.”248 However, this is
not the case. The Supreme Court omitted mention of Buckman because the
agency fraud was no longer an issue in the case. The Court might also have
avoided weighing in on Buckman because the Court was concerned that, as
in Warner-Lambert, the politics of preemption would deadlock the Court,
providing future litigants with no clear path forward.
Although the Court did not revisit the fraud issue, Albrecht cannot stand
for the proposition that anything defendants submit to the FDA, even if
fraudulent, can “fully inform” the agency under the clear evidence
framework. Manufacturers cannot evade state law tort liability by inundating
the FDA with information, armed with Buckman as a protection from any
liability. This is exactly the “moral hazard” concern that Justice Gorsuch
articulated during oral arguments.249 To protect against such abuse, lower
courts should adopt Judge Calabresi’s narrow view of Buckman: a
242. Compare Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Lab’ys, 385 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he
[fraud] exemptions are invalid as applied in some settings (e.g., when a plaintiff asks a state
court to find bribery or fraud on the FDA) but not in others (e.g. claims based on federal
findings of bribery or fraud on the FDA).”), with Desiano, 467 F.3d at 94–95 (disagreeing
with Garcia in holding that Buckman did not preempt traditional state law tort claims that
triggered the statute’s fraud exemption).
243. See Zipursky, supra note 239, at 1791 (noting that courts’ views on the applicability
of Buckman “are all over the map”).
244. See Sharkey, supra note 231, at 848.
245. Id. at 845.
246. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 354 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
247. See Beck, supra note 229 (“Surprisingly, neither the majority nor any of the
concurring opinions in Albrecht even mention Buckman—another sign that Albrecht’s dictum
was not well thought out.”).
248. See James M. Beck, Reflections on Albrecht—What Preemption Being a “Legal
Question” Might Mean, DRUG & DEVICE L. BLOG (May 23, 2019),
https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2019/05/reflections-on-albrecht-what-preemptionbeing-a-legal-question-might-mean.html [https://perma.cc/97NE-XDBN].
249. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 13.
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presumption against preemption should apply to fraud-on-the-FDA claims
that arise as exceptions to defenses to state law failure-to-warn claims.
Alternatively, courts can adopt Justice Stevens’s more moderate approach
and hold that fraud-on-the-FDA claims in cases like Albrecht can only
proceed if the FDA has previously established the existence of fraud.
3. Is Actual FDA Response Required?
Establishing how defendants can fully inform the FDA is only the first
piece of the inquiry. Once a defendant shows it fully informed the FDA,
Justice Breyer’s framework requires that defendants show that “the FDA, in
turn, informed the drug manufacturer that [it] would not approve changing
the drug’s label to include that warning.”250 This second prong raises
questions about whether the FDA must actually notify defendants of a
decision not to require a label or if FDA inaction can “inform” defendants of
the FDA’s determination that further warnings are unnecessary.
As Justice Alito noted in his concurring opinion, in certain scenarios, FDA
inaction may signal the agency’s determination that a label change is not
required.251 Under 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4)(A), if the secretary of health and
human services discovers new information about a drug and determines that
a label change is required based on this data, the FDA has a duty to
unilaterally initiate a label change.252 “The FDA’s duty does not depend on
whether the relevant drug manufacturer, as opposed to some other entity or
individual, brought the new information to the FDA’s attention.”253
However, if the secretary decides not to act on this new information about a
drug, the FDA is not required to communicate to the relevant drug
manufacturer that a label change is unwarranted; the agency can simply
decide not to act.254
In a case like Albrecht, where a defendant-manufacturer has submitted a
proposed label change and the secretary’s unilateral actions under
§ 355(o)(4)(A) are not at issue, an actual FDA response is likely required to
fully inform defendants that a proposed label was rejected. A state court in
Connecticut recently addressed a defendant’s argument that was based on
Justice Alito’s concurrence.255 The defendant contended that “submission of
data to the FDA, even after the injury in question, followed by FDA inaction
demonstrates that the FDA would have rejected a proposed labeling change
even if the [manufacturer] had submitted the information in time for a label
change prior to the injury.”256 The court noted “[t]here is admittedly some

250. Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1668, 1678 (2019).
251. Id. at 1684 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4)(A).
255. Roberto v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., No. CPLHHDCV166068484S, 2019
WL 5068452, at *24 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 2019) (citing Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1684
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment)).
256. Id.
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logic to this argument.”257 However, it ultimately rejected the argument and
held that Albrecht required a showing of clear evidence “that the FDA
actually informed the drug manufacturer that the FDA would not approve
changing the drug’s label to include that warning.”258 This case illustrates
that lower courts are already using the Albrecht concurrences to inform their
answers to impossibility preemption questions.
4. Summary
In sum, the fully informed requirement should be restricted to cases
involving rejections of proposed label changes, rather than other third-party
methods of informing the FDA. At a minimum, a defendant can satisfy this
requirement if, after providing the FDA with an up-to-date analysis of the
risk at issue, the FDA refused to accept the additional warning. While an
actual FDA response might not be necessary in every case, when a
defendant’s proposed label change is at issue, an FDA response is likely
necessary to ensure that a defendant is adequately informed of the FDA’s
decision. Courts should adopt a narrow or moderate view of Buckman.
Further, defendants facing failure-to-warn claims cannot use Buckman as a
broad shield from tort liability.
B. When Do State and Federal Laws Irreconcilably Conflict?
In addition to analyzing what fully informs the FDA, lower court judges
deciding impossibility preemption questions must interpret what it means for
state and federal laws to irreconcilably conflict.259 Although the Supreme
Court notes this is a “simpl[e] ask,” in reality, it seems quite complex.260
In the context of proposed label changes, as in Wyeth and Albrecht, an
analysis of irreconcilable conflict must begin by determining whether a
defendant’s proposed label provides an adequate description of a drug’s
risks. If the FDA rejects a brand-name drug manufacturer’s label change
because the agency determines the label is inadequate, a defendantmanufacturer cannot argue that this rejection makes it impossible to comply
with both state and federal law. A proposed warning is adequate if it provides
clear, comprehensive, and accurate information about a drug’s risks and side
effects.261 As Professors John C. P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky
noted in their amicus brief to the Court, the “FDA’s rejection of [Merck’s]
understated and muddled warning in no way indicates that the agency would
have rejected a warning of the risk of atypical femoral fractures that was
257. Id.
258. Id. (quoting Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1678).
259. Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1679 (2019) (“The
existence of a hypothetical or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant the preemption of the
state statute” (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982))).
260. Id.
261. See Brief of Tort Law Professors John C. P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 21, at *14 (“Under state law, adequacy
is a function of the accuracy and completeness of the information accompanying a product, as
well as the prominence, clarity, and urgency with which that information is presented.”).
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adequate in the relevant dimensions.”262 In fact, the FDA invited Merck to
resubmit an adequate proposed warnings and precautions label but Merck
failed to do so.263 Because there is a strong argument that Merck never
presented the FDA with an adequate label concerning atypical femoral
fractures, Merck cannot argue that the FDA’s rejection of its 2008 proposed
warnings and precautions label creates an irreconcilable conflict between
state and federal law.264 A key purpose of state failure-to-warn law is
protection against inadequate labeling of drugs’ dangerous side effects and
risks.265 Defendant-manufacturers cannot use impossibility preemption as a
mechanism to avoid their state law duties.266 The issue of inadequate
labeling traces back to Wyeth.267 In fact, the proposed warning rejected by
the FDA in Wyeth was considerably stronger than the rejected “stress
fractures” label at issue in Albrecht, highlighting the weakness of Merck’s
conflict argument.268 “Evidence of a rejection of an adequate warning is the
‘clear evidence’ that was missing in [Wyeth], and is likewise missing in
[Albrecht].”269 Thus, the question becomes whether any warning that would
have been adequate under state law would have been impermissible
according to the FDA. If there are some clear and nuanced warnings that
would have been permissible to the FDA and also would have been adequate
under state law, there is no irreconcilable conflict.
Justice Breyer’s framework in Albrecht also raises questions about
whether the CBE label change process will preclude brand-name drug
manufacturers from showing that state and federal law irreconcilably
conflict.270 Under CBE regulations, drug manufacturers can unilaterally
change a drug’s label if changing the label would add or strengthen a warning
based on new information that shows a causal link between a drug and a risk
or harm.271 In Wyeth, the Court reasoned that because Wyeth made no
attempt to make a label change through the CBE process, it failed to show it
was impossible to change its product label under state law and still comply
with federal law.272 In Albrecht, “Merck conceded that the FDA’s CBE
regulation would have permitted [it] to try to change the label to add a

262. Id. at *3.
263. See supra Part II.A.1.
264. See Brief of Tort Law Professors John C. P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 21, at *3 (noting that “it was entirely
possible for [Merck] to comply with both federal and state law by simply proposing or adding
an adequate warning”).
265. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574–75 (2009).
266. Id. at 575.
267. Id. at 572 (“[Wyeth] does not argue that it attempted to give the kind of warning
required by the Vermont jury but was prohibited from doing so by the FDA.”).
268. Id. at 562–63.
269. Brief of Tort Law Professors John C. P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 21, at *23 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
270. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) (2019).
271. See Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1673 (2019).
272. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 572.
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warning before [the FDA required it to do so in] 2010” but argued that the
FDA would have rejected such a warning.273
While Wyeth and Albrecht demonstrate that the availability of the CBE
label change process will severely weaken many impossibility preemption
arguments, the CBE regulation does not destroy the impossibility preemption
defense because the regulation cannot be applied in every case. As
previously stated, label changes made in accordance with the CBE regulation
can only be based on “newly acquired information,” and the FDA has stated
it will “not allow a change to labeling to add a warning in the absence of
reasonable evidence of an association between the product and an adverse
event.”274 Courts must also note that “the FDA contemplated that the CBE
regulation would be used sparingly.”275 For example, one federal court
applying Albrecht recently held that a single study performed on mice
showing a drug’s adverse effects fails to establish such reasonable evidence
and cannot support a state law failure-to-warn claim arguing that a defendantmanufacturer should have attempted to add a CBE label change.276 If
plaintiffs cannot plausibly show that a defendant-manufacturer could have
unilaterally changed its label, it will be much easier for defendants to show
that failure-to-warn claims are preempted.277
Because CBE label changes are only available if certain new information
becomes available, courts should not read Wyeth or Albrecht to require
defendant-manufacturers to attempt unilateral label changes to show that
compliance with state and federal law is impossible. Such a requirement runs
headlong into Justice Gorsuch’s concern that manufacturers will flood the
FDA with inartful, confusing warnings in the hopes that the FDA will reject
them.278 Defendants cannot plan their own label rejections to show an
irreconcilable conflict between state and federal law.
Justice Thomas’s concurrence should also inform courts’ understanding of
what demonstrates an irreconcilable conflict.279 In both Wyeth and Albrecht,
Justice Thomas argued that evidence from the founding era shows that state
and federal law directly conflict when they are in logical contradiction, even
if compliance with both laws is possible.280 In Albrecht, Justice Thomas
273. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1675.
274. Supplemental Application Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs,
Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 2848, 2851 (Jan. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 314, 601, and 814) (emphasis added) (quoting FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PUBLIC
AVAILABILITY OF LABELING CHANGES IN “CHANGES BEING EFFECTED SUPPLEMENTS” 2 n.4
(2006), https://www.fda.gov/media/71848/download [https://perma.cc/RK67-7PF9]).
275. McGrath v. Bayer HealthCare Pharm. Inc., 393 F. Supp. 3d 161, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
276. Id.
277. See Goodell v. Bayer Healthcare Pharm. Inc., No. 18-cv-10694, 2019 WL 4771136,
at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2019) (“Without factual allegations that Bayer had new information
in this time period such that it could have or should have amended the label pursuant to the
CBE regulation, the complaint is barred as preempted.”).
278. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 13.
279. See Merck Sharp & Dohme v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1681–84 (2019) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
280. Id. at 1681; Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 590 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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noted that “if federal law gives an individual the right to engage in certain
behavior that state law prohibits, the laws would give contradictory
commands notwithstanding the fact that an individual could comply with
both by electing to refrain from the covered behavior.”281 In a recent
concurrence to a denial of certiorari, Justice Gorsuch also noted that “[a]t the
time of the founding, [the Supremacy] Clause would have been understood
to pre-empt state law only if the law logically contradicted the ‘Constitution,’
[or] the ‘Laws of the United States.’”282 This opinion shows that the
idiosyncratic “logical contradiction” method may be gaining support among
the bench as future preemption cases reach the Supreme Court.
In sum, the FDA’s rejection of an inadequate label change does not create
an irreconcilable conflict between state and federal law. Additionally, while
the availability of the CBE regulation weakens the impossibility preemption
defense, the limited applicability of CBE label changes restricts courts’
ability to require these label changes to demonstrate an irreconcilable
conflict. In addition to an impossibility preemption analysis, courts should
conduct a “logical contradiction” analysis because this method is supported
by at least two Justices.
C. What Actions Are Within the Scope of the FDA’s Congressionally
Delegated Authority?
The final question raised by Justice Breyer’s Albrecht framework relates
to the Court’s statement that only agency actions “taken pursuant to the
FDA’s congressionally delegated authority” can determine the answer to
preemption questions.283 The answer to this question is especially relevant
to the future of the Fosamax litigation. In its order remanding the case back
to the district court, the Third Circuit specifically instructed the court to
“determine the effect of the FDA’s Complete Response Letter and other
communications with Merck on the issue of whether such agency actions are
sufficient to give rise to preemption.”284
While Justice Breyer cautioned that “[t]he question of disapproval
‘method’ [was] not . . . before [the Court],” he noted that, “[f]ederal law
permits the FDA to communicate its disapproval of a warning by means of
notice-and-comment rulemaking setting forth labeling standards; by formally
rejecting a warning label that would have been adequate under state law; or
with other agency action carrying the force of law.”285 To properly decide
impossibility preemption questions, lower courts must adopt a common
understanding of these other agency actions.
First, courts should establish what agency actions do not carry the force of
law. In Wyeth, the Court held that the FDA’s 2006 preamble declaring that
281. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1681 (quoting Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 590).
282. Lipschultz v. Charter Advanced Servs. (MN), LLC, 140 S. Ct. 6, 7 (2019) (Mem.)
(quoting Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 260 (2000)).
283. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1679 (emphasis added).
284. Remand Order, supra note 204, at 1.
285. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1679 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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state law failure-to-warn claims threaten the role of the FDA did not carry
the force of law because “Congress has not authorized the FDA to pre-empt
state law directly.”286
The Albrecht concurring opinions provide little consensus on this point.
Justice Thomas advocated for an even narrower position, noting that only
final agency actions carry the force of law.287 Unlike the majority opinion,
Justice Thomas did not consider the FDA’s 2009 response letter to Merck’s
stress fracture warning to carry the force of law because response letters have
“no implication as to the ultimate approvability of [an] application.”288
Justice Thomas also noted that “neither agency musings nor hypothetical
future rejections constitute pre-emptive ‘Laws.’”289 Conversely, Justice
Alito argued that in several scenarios, FDA inaction may carry the force of
law, such as when the secretary of health and human services chooses not to
act on newly acquired information under § 355(o)(4)(A).290 Justice Alito
also noted the relevance of the FDA’s informal communications with Merck
leading up to the required label change in 2010.291 Recognizing all FDA
contacts with defendant-manufacturers as relevant to the preemption analysis
gives the FDA much latitude to preempt state law claims. One federal court
recently noted that public informal communications between the FDA and
drug manufacturers should receive such judicial notice.292 While confusion
and controversy remain regarding what specific agency actions have
preemptive effect, one trend is clear: Albrecht continues the Supreme
Court’s trend of shifting institutional power away from the courts and into
the hands of federal agencies.293
CONCLUSION
As products liability suits against pharmaceutical companies continue to
rise, federal preemption in the prescription drug context is likely to remain a
hotly litigated issue. The Supreme Court’s renewed interest in the federal
preemption doctrine marks an important step forward in clarifying the
procedure for deciding impossibility preemption defenses. It is now clear
that judges, rather than juries, must decide impossibility preemption
questions as a matter of law. However, divides among the Justices as to how
these questions should be answered remain. While Justice Breyer’s
framework in the Court’s recent Albrecht decision contains several
interpretive gaps, it is nonetheless illuminating for lower courts trying to
286. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 575–76 (2009).
287. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1683 (Thomas, J., concurring).
288. Id. (emphasis omitted).
289. Id. at 1682 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
290. Id. at 1684 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
291. Id. at 1686.
292. See Bowling v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 17-cv-3982, 2018 WL 1587598, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2018) (holding that “because . . . FDA . . . warning letters are publicly
available evidence of agency actions, the Court deems it proper to take judicial notice of
them”).
293. Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 595 (2012).
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frame impossibility preemption questions. The concurring opinions in
Albrecht and the case law since 2009 help to fill the gaps left by the majority
opinion and are instructive for courts ruling on these defenses.

